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The aim of this article is to describe the political
economy of an urban famine that occurred in
Antananarivo, the capital city of Madagascar, in
1985–6. This famine is atypical in many respects,
since it was an urban famine occurring in
peacetime,1 and it remained hidden for a long time.
It was discovered by analysing the demographic
data of deaths registered in the city (Garenne et al.
2002). This analysis focuses on the economic and
political mechanisms underlying the crisis.
1 Demographic evidence
Antananarivo lies in the highlands of central
Madagascar. The city accounted for about 577,000
inhabitants in 1985, and it is characterised by slow
population growth due to low migration flows
compared with most other African capital cities.
This is primarily due to a lack of economic
opportunities and of international aid in the 1970s
and 1980s, as will be seen below.
A long tradition of birth and death registration
exists in Madagascar. It started before the colonial
period during the successful reign of Queen
Ranavalona II, was developed under French
colonial rule, and remained of high quality in the
post-independence period. Vital registration seems
to be virtually complete in urban areas, especially in
Antananarivo. Comparison with Demographic and
Health Survey (DHS) data and with demographic
models did not reveal any evidence of under-
registration of deaths in the capital city for the
1976–95 period (Garenne et al. 2002). Not only are
vital events properly registered, but causes of death
are also available for Antananarivo, a rare situation
in sub-Saharan Africa. Causes of death are certified
by physicians, whether the death occurred in the
hospital or elsewhere. These data do exist, but were
not processed, not published and not analysed,
until a team led by Pierre Cantrelle undertook a
systematic coding of all mortality data and causes of
death for the 1976–95 period. This is how the
1985–6 famine was uncovered: by analysing the
demographic data and the causes of death before
and after the 1985–6 crisis. A full-scale life-table
analysis of the 1976–95 data has been published
elsewhere (Waltisperger et al. 1998).
The mortality data recorded in Antananarivo for
the 1976–95 period clearly show a typical famine
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in 1985–6. Compared with mortality levels before
1985 and after 1987, death rates increased
markedly in 1985–6 and life expectancy in 1986
(at 49.0 years) had dropped by about 10 years
compared with levels in 1975 (59.4 years) or in
1995 (59.8 years). The mortality increases bear all
the characteristics of a famine: a strong relative
increase among children, especially 5–9 year-olds
(Risk Ratio compared with the baseline: RR=2.5)
and young adults, especially young men aged
20–34 years (RR=2.2). In absolute terms, it was
estimated that about 7,600 persons died in 1985–6
in excess of baseline mortality levels, about half of
whom were children under age 15, with a small
excess of boys, about a third being adults aged
15–59, among whom 74 per cent were men, and
the remainder being elderly people, with again a
higher male mortality. Compared with the size of
the city, this implies that some 1.3 per cent of the
population died because of the famine, a rate that
compares with some other mild famines, though
much lower than great famines where larger
proportions of the population died of starvation.
The main evidence of the famine lies in the ‘causes
of death’ profile, which is especially clear for young
adults. Mortality from malnutrition (starvation)
among adults hardly existed before 1984 and after
1988, whereas it showed a huge peak in 1986
(Figure 1). The same peak can be observed in
children over the same period, even though
mortality from malnutrition did occur before and
after the crisis period, as elsewhere in Africa. The
peak in mortality from malnutrition is doubled by
a peak of mortality due to an exceedingly rare
disease: alveolitis of the jaws (Figure 1). This
disease occurs primarily in rodent populations,
when animals facing food scarcity end up eating
roots and other food too hard for their teeth. It also
occurs in human populations as a result of
improper dental surgical procedures. This disease
produces an infection of the jaws, which is often
lethal. It seems that in Antananarivo starving
people started eating hard sugar-cane and
destroyed their jaws. Indeed, the few cases of death
attributed by physicians to this disease were all
concentrated in the crisis years.
In addition to typical starvation, deaths from other
causes also increased: in particular deaths from
diarrhoeal diseases (often associated with
malnutrition), deaths from acute respiratory
infections, and deaths from cardiovascular diseases
among adults. There was, however, no evidence of
any significant epidemic of infectious diseases – as
is often seen in famine situations – such as typhoid,
typhus, measles, cholera, or dysentery. It seems
therefore that the Antananarivo urban famine was
primarily due to starvation and its metabolic
consequences. The 1985–6 period in Antananarivo
therefore meets the demographic criteria of a
famine, as defined by an increase in mortality from
starvation.
56
Figure 1: Trends in the number of deaths due to malnutrition, Antananarivo, 1976–95
2 Political and economic
precursors
To understand what happened in 1985–6 in
Antananarivo it is necessary to overview the political
and economic history of Madagascar. The great
island enjoyed a relatively wealthy situation in the
pre-colonial period. It was annexed by France in
1896, and was fully pacified in 1906, after some
minor fighting. De-colonisation went smoothly: by
1958 a republic was formed under president
Tsiranana, two years before formal independence in
1960. The first 11 years of independence were quite
peaceful, but civil unrest exploded in 1971 around
economic issues in both urban and rural areas,
which was followed by a series of coups d’êtat. In
1972, General Ramanatsoa took power, to be
replaced three years later by Admiral Ratsiraka, who
started the so-called ‘Malagasy revolution’ (2nd
Republic). The new regime followed quite a strict
Marxist line, cut itself off from Western powers, and
received support from Russia, China and North
Korea. After about 10 years of severe economic
mismanagement, in particular the 1978–80 period
of ‘extreme investment’ (investissement à outrance),
the country went virtually bankrupt. The
government started changing policies in 1984/85,
re-established links with the IMF and the World
Bank as well as with France and other Western
countries, and accepted the structural adjustment
policies that were in vogue at that time. Free elections
were organised in 1993 and were won by a liberal, Dr
Safy, who changed the constitution (3rd Republic).
However, Ratsiraka was re-elected four years later, in
1997 and remained in power until December 2001.
These dramatic political changes are closely linked to
economic performance, and to the 1985–6 crisis.
During the colonial period, Madagascar followed a
classic path of rural economic development, with a
priority on exported cash crops, in particular
vanilla. In the late colonial period (1950–9) and
the early independence period (1960–71), it
followed a liberal import-substitution policy, which
was moderately successful. According to Maddison
(2001), income per capita expressed in purchasing
power parity (GNP–PPP) was increasing during
this period, from an estimated US$951 in 1950 to
an estimated US$1,246 in 1971, a slow but
consistent growth of 1.3 per cent per year.
Compared with income levels in other African
countries in 1971, Madagascar ranked in the
middle – 18th in a list of 38 countries for which
income estimates were available – even though
economic growth was somewhat lower than
elsewhere during the 1950–71 period (the median
value for sub-Saharan Africa was 2.0 per cent). The
economic situation of Madagascar deteriorated
rapidly after 1971, and by 1998 income per capita
had dropped to US$690, that is almost half of what
it was 27 years earlier, a negative economic growth
of -2.2 per cent a year, and a level lower than in
1950. In 1998, Madagascar was in one of the worst
economic situations in Africa, ranking 29th in the
same list of countries, and had experienced one of
the worst economic downturns for the continent,
together with countries devastated by civil war
such as Sierra Leone and Angola.
The situation in Antananarivo city was no better
than in the rest of the country. According to detailed
household consumption surveys, real income per
capita in Antananarivo also declined regularly over
the 1961–95 period, from an estimated value of
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Table 1: Structure of household consumption in various years (from household consumption
surveys), Antananarivo, 1961–95
1961 1968/9 1977/8 1993/4 1994/5
Household consumption (1983 MGF) 1,417,898 1,253,940 997,530 934,256 787,581
Proportion spent on food (%) 37.8 39.1 47.6 50.0 47.3
Caloric value of three main food items 1,713 – 1,355 1,410 1,217
Caloric value of rice (%) 78.0 – 81.8 79.3 87.0
Source: Ravelosoa and Roubaud 1996. 
Note: Household expenditures are in constant 1983 Malagasy Francs (MGF). Caloric values of three main
food items (cereals, meat, sugar) are given in kcal, converted from household consumption.
‘–’ = missing information
1.42 million MGF in 1961, to 1.25 in 1968/69,
0.99 in 1977/78, 0.93 in 1993/94 and 0.79 in
1994/95 (Ravelosoa and Roubaud 1996).2 This
decline in real income translated into decline in
food consumption over the same period of time,
from an estimated 1,713 kcal per person in 1961 to
an estimated 1,410 in 1993/94 for the three main
food items: cereals, meat and sugar (Table 1). The
composition of the diet also changed between 1961
and 1995, with a decrease of 21 per cent in rice
consumption, 42 per cent in bread, 52 per cent in
sugar and about 60 per cent in meat consumption.
As a result mean height went down over the period,
a further evidence of increasing malnutrition.
3 Rice production, consumption
and marketing
Rice is the main agricultural crop and the main
staple food in Madagascar. The country was largely
self-sufficient, and even exported rice, in the 1950s
and 1960s. Per capita rice production was
increasing during the 1960s and culminated in
1968 with a value of 194 kg per capita, exceeding
the reference basic needs value of 183 kg per adult
per year. However, rice production per capita then
started declining very steeply in the early 1970s,
reaching a low point of 140 kg per capita in 1976,
before increasing again for a few years to reach 168
kg in 1986 (the famine year), and declining
thereafter to a new low value of 126 kg in 1996
(Figure 2). It should be noted that the production
of rice in 1985–6 was probably high enough to
cover all needs, since children’s needs are lower
than average, and was rather better than in many
preceding and succeeding years which were free of
famine. Therefore, food availability cannot be
considered as a valid factor explaining the 1985–6
famine in Antananarivo.
The price of rice has been quite stable over long
periods of time, despite seasonal and yearly
fluctuations, with values around 217 MGF per kilo
in constant 1983 prices (Azam and Bonjean 1995;
Araujo-Bonjean and Azam 1996). During the late
colonial period and until 1971, the rice market was
free, but the price of rice was stabilised by the state
through a specialised institution (caisse de
péréquation), a common policy in colonial Africa for
the main food crops and the main cash crops as well.
With the installation of a communist regime, the rice
market, both internal and external, was controlled
by a State monopoly, and the price of rice was fixed
by the government. However, the price paid to
farmers for their rice was fixed at too low a level,
which discouraged local producers who decreased
their production, until rice had to be imported and
sold at low prices to satisfy the increasing demand of
the urban population. With the policy changes
initiated in 1984, the internal rice market was open
to private merchants, and producer prices increased
somewhat. In 1985, price controls on rice were
lifted, and internal trade was fully liberalised in
1986. International trade was open to the private
sector only in 1990. The 1985–6 years were
therefore years when domestic rice trading and
prices could be fixed by private traders, but imports
of rice remained under State control.
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Figure 2: Rice production in Madagascar (kg per capita)
Rice is grown only once a year in Madagascar, and is
harvested between June and September. In a normal
year the price of rice is lowest in May and during the
harvest season, then increases steadily until the next
harvest, a classic case of rational expectations by the
stockholders (Araujo-Bonjean and Azam 1996). The
range of price fluctuations is moderate in normal
years, roughly speaking ±15 per cent. However,
during the crisis years the fluctuations were dramatic,
and the result of the transition period was a massive
increase in the price of rice on urban markets (Figure
3). The rice price, in constant 1983 Malagasy Francs,
was 240 MGF in June 1985, and increased to 640
MGF by December 1985, that is three times more
than its baseline value of 217 MGF. This seems to
have been due to the speculation of newly authorised
merchants, who anticipated a price increase, wanted
to increase their stocks, and expected that the
government would not import rice (Araujo-Bonjean
and Azam 1996). Trade between rural and urban
areas had just been liberalised and was controlled by
a few agents. Prices went down just before the next
harvest, and averaged 315 MGF in May–June 1986,
still 45 per cent above the baseline price. They
increased again in the following months, and peaked
at 415 MGF in October for the same reasons, before
falling to their baseline level at the time of the next
harvest, in May 1987. The famine mortality followed
quite clearly the evolution of rice prices in
Antananarivo (compare Figures 1 and 3).
The impact of the price increase can be understood
by considering the structure of expenses in
household budgets. In household consumption
surveys, food accounted on average for about half
of total expenditure: 47.7 per cent in 1977/78 and
50.0 per cent in 1993/94 (Ravelosoa and Roubaud
1996). Among the food products purchased, rice
and bread accounted for more than a third of the
total (33.1 per cent in 1977/78 and 43.2 per cent
in 1993/94), and rice accounted for some 90 per
cent of this (93.6 per cent in 1977/78 and 85.6 per
cent in 1993/94). Altogether, rice provided about
80 per cent of the total daily caloric intake of
Antananarivo households (81.8 per cent in
1977/78 and 79.3 per cent in 1993/94). These are
average values for all households, rich and poor.
When the price of rice trebled in a short period of
time, expenditure on rice accounted for more than
half of the total budget for the average household,
and simply exceeded the total budget of poor
households. According to the above calculations,
this was the case for those living on less than 55 per
cent of the average household income, as was the
case for unskilled workers (Table 2). Even if there
was some substitution between rice and bread over
the 1977–94 period, it was minor since the price of
imported wheat was much higher and did not
enable the poor to cope with the strong increase in
rice prices.
4 Discussion
The explanation for the Antananarivo famine of
1985–6 appears quite clear in terms of an
economic analysis. Rapid deregulation of rice
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Figure 3: Trends in the price of rice (constant 1983 price), Antananarivo, 1983–92
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prices and rice markets, following a long period of
strict State regulation and not accompanied by
proper public policies, implied a rapid increase in
the price of rice, the staple food of the large
majority of a poor population. The poorest strata
could not cope with the increasing cost of what
constituted 80 per cent of their food intake, and
many died of starvation as a result. Although data
is lacking on the distribution of income of those
who died of hunger, poverty certainly played an
important role. Poverty was increasing in
Madagascar over the period preceding the crisis,
and started to decrease only ten years later, after
1996. It seems that the combination of poor
economic policies together with extensive poverty
was the main immediate reason for the famine.
Many public policies could have permitted the
poor to cope with the crisis, such as imports of rice
to stabilise rice markets, requesting international
aid, providing access to credit for the poor, or
providing jobs for unemployed people. In this
context, it is worth recalling the solutions that were
found to the problem of famine in Europe during
the eighteenth century. They involved two main
aspects: improving the market mechanism, in
particular market integration and transportation,
and state intervention, in particular interventions
in the labour market (by providing small jobs to
farmers in need), regulation of food stocks and
food import policies. The first approach developed
along the lines of the analysis of market
mechanisms made by Adam Smith (1776) and his
followers. The second approach developed with
Turgot (1766) in France, who studied the famines
in Berry and developed the appropriate public
policies, well described by Rothschild (2001). In a
more recent case, Ravallion (1987; 1997) has noted
that ‘in Bangladesh food grain price stabilisation
would have reduced famine mortality’ during the
1974 famine.
Beyond market failure and institutional failure,
several other factors may have played a role in the
Antananarivo famine. Geographical isolation of the
capital city in the highlands together with a very
poor road system may have contributed to market
segmentation, already aggravated by the lack of
incentives to rice farmers during the 1972–84
period, due to the State-controlled economy. Ó
Gráda and Chevet (1999) have shown that more
than ‘market failures’ it is ‘market segmentation’
that explains the Anjou famine in seventeenth-
century France. Highly localised markets and high
transportation costs may also explain features of
twentieth-century Ethiopian famines (von Braun et
al. 1998). Beyond market failures, institutional
failures or faulty policy may also be the cause of
famines, as in the well-known cases of the Stalin
era famine in Ukraine (1932–3) and the ‘Great
Leap Forward’ famine in China (1958–61)
(Devereux 1993).
Like other urban famines, the famine process in
Madagascar was not started by a natural disaster. It
was not started by violent events or a military
blockade either, as in most other urban famines of
the twentieth century. It was the changing economic
situation of 1984–6 that created a ‘market trap’ with
effects similar to those of a blockade: rice was
available in the country or could easily be imported,
but people could not access it because of a lack of
‘entitlement’. Sen (1981) theorised that in many
cases famine is primarily a consequence of
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Table 2: Relative income of five socio-economic categories, Antananarivo 1961–95
Category 1961 1968/9 1977/8 1994/5
Professional, upper 2.22 3.21 3.13 2.53
Professional, medium 1.44 2.09 2.02 1.83
Clerical 1.13 1.20 1.05 0.97
Skilled workers 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.73
Unskilled workers 0.58 0.62 0.54 0.62
Source: Ravelosoa and Roubaud 1996. 
Note: Relative income is calculated as the ratio of the income for each socio-economic category to the
average for the population.
‘exchange entitlement failure’ – that is a rapid
increase in food prices relative to income – rather
than a food availability decline or a proper ‘market
failure’. If people had higher incomes or could
access credit, they would be able to purchase the
food they needed to survive the crisis.
International aid could have been easily mobilised,
if the government had taken the appropriate steps.
In this context, Sylvie Brunel (2002) has developed
a typology of famines in relation to international
politics and the international aid business. In a
study of recent African famines, Brunel
distinguishes between three categories of famines:
l famines ‘hidden’ by local political powers,
primarily to avoid criticism of their own
policies (cases include the Ethiopian famine of
1984, the Kivu (Congo) famine of 1996, and
famines in former communist countries)
l famines ‘exposed’ by political leaders, in order
to maximise the amount of food relief and
international aid, which may also be used for
other purposes (an example being the Biafra
famine of 1968–70)
l famines ‘created’ by political groups, in order to
provoke international aid (such as the Liberia
and Sierra Leone famines of the late 1990s) –
aid on which some guerrilla movements are
totally dependent, as pointed out by Pérouse
de Montlos (2002).
Following Brunel’s typology, the Madagascar
famine seems to have been ‘hidden’ from the start,
probably to hide the major failures of previous
policies, a common feature of Marxist regimes, and
possibly not to put the changing policies at risk.
Surprisingly, the famine was hidden not only to the
press, but also to economists working at that time
on the economic reforms. Had the press been free
to report the case, and had economists been
properly informed of the situation, public ‘coping
mechanisms’ could have been put in place. The
role of information and freedom of the press had
been stressed earlier by Drèze and Sen (1989).
Little is known of the situation in rural areas. The
mortality increase seen among children in the vital
registration of Antananarivo over the 1975–86
period, with a peak of mortality in 1985–6 at the
time of the famine, was also visible in the nationally
representative sample of the Demographic and
Health Surveys, in both urban and rural areas. No
comparable data is currently available for adults.
Madagascar has suffered several natural disasters
over past decades, such as cyclones, flood, and
locust invasion. Very little is known of the mortality
situation in rural areas, and it remains possible that
other famines have occurred in some rural areas for
other reasons as well. However, the country is far
more open now than before, and famine relief
agencies are very active throughout Africa. Early
warning systems – such as FAO’s ‘GIEWS’ and
USAID’s ‘FEWSNET’ – monitor the food situation
closely and are generally able to mobilise support to
those in need more rapidly than ever before. The
information capacity of the Web is another
increasingly powerful element in famine prevention:
looking at the GIEWS or FEWSNET website
provides immediate and appropriate information to
people concerned with famine relief. These services
were not available in 1985, and the network of relief
agencies was not as extensive as it is now.
The new information technology, as well as more
integrated markets, makes another famine such as
that of Antananarivo in 1985–6 quite unlikely in the
future. Conversely, the fact that the country remained
quite closed, both to information and to international
markets, for some 15 years was probably the main
underlying cause of this atypical famine.
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Notes
1. Several urban famines occurred during the twentieth
century, mainly in Western Europe, during wartime,
and usually as a result of a blockade – in Germany
(1915–17), the Greek islands (1942/43), Holland
(1943/44), the Warsaw Ghetto (1943/44) and
Leningrad (1941–4) (see also Watson, in this
Bulletin).
2. The Malagasy Franc (MGF) was quite stable in the
1960s and 1970s, around an average of 250 MGF=1
USD; its value went down dramatically thereafter,
from 676 in 1986, 1,494 in 1990 and stabilised only
after 1998 at around 6,300 to the USD.
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